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 Abstract—The paper introduces a topology mutation – the novel 
concept in Moving Target Defense (MTD). MTD is a new technique 
that represents a significant shift in cyber defense. Traditional 
cybersecurity techniques have primarily focused on the passive 
defense of static networks only. In MTD approach cyber attackers 
are confused by making the attack surface dynamic, and thus 
harder to probe and infiltrate. The emergence of Network 
Functions Virtualization (NFV) and Software-Defined Networking 
(SDN) technology has opened up new possibilities in network 
architecture management. The application of combined NFV and 
SDN technologies provides a unique platform for implementing 
MTD techniques for securing the network infrastructure by 
morphing the logical view of the network topology. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
ROM the cyber attacker’s perspective, a network attack is 
intendent to locate and analyze the targeted system and to 
find out the existence of vulnerability in network resources. 
Every such a vulnerability opens cyber-threat vector (attack 
vector) and makes security operations more complex. The 
totality of all vulnerabilities in a system forms the attack surface. 
After attack vectors are identified, attackers take intrusive 
actions to gain access to the system resources. 
An adversary who conducts cyber-attacks frequently follows 
this methodology, performing an extensive survey of their target 
organization. This integrated, end-to-end process is described as 
a cyber kill-chain, a widely accepted, multistage segmental type 
intrusive model proposed by Lockheed Martin cooperation in 
[1]. 
Most computer networks have the static nature. This gives an 
attacker great advantage – time. Adversaries are able to perform 
network reconnaissance and identify vulnerabilities, which can 
be exploited by identifying potential targets and their 
vulnerabilities [2]. An insider adversary may use highly 
effective scanning strategies for network reconnaissance. By 
probing networked environments an attacker is able to identify 
hosts and open ports and map their topology to find known and 
zero-day vulnerabilities to perform further attack manoeuvres. 
In fact, previous studies have shown that entire topologies can 
be precisely mapped with traceroute provided enough probing 
points are used [3]. 
Moving Target Defense (MTD) has emerged as a solution to 
deal with security issues associated with the static nature of 
computer networks. This is one of the most promising trends in 
cyber defense. In this approach cyber attackers are confused by 
making the attack surface dynamic, and thus harder to probe and 
infiltrate. It represents a significant shift in the cyber defense, 
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which has primarily focused on the passive defense of static 
networks. In the past few years, MTD developed rapidly and a 
large number of concepts and approaches have been proposed. 
In [4] an overview of different cyber moving-target techniques, 
their threat models, and technical details are presented. 
The ways to design, build and operate networks have changed 
with the emergence of Network Functions Virtualization (NFV) 
and Software-Defined Networking (SDN) technology. These 
trends are transforming network management and make it 
possible to propose new sophisticated MTD-based techniques. 
Together, SDN and NFV technologies are making it easier to 
provision network resources, enabling greater network 
flexibility, dynamic network deployment with fast instantiation, 
support for Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS) hardware and 
significant cost savings. These technologies allow creating 
virtualized network architectures (built of physical and virtual 
network components), that can be shaped and changed 
according to the needs. 
The paper discusses the application of the NFV and the SDN 
technology to provide a unique platform for implementing the 
novel MTD technique – topology mutation. The concept is 
based on creating virtualized network architecture, that is 
morphed in time by dynamic introduction of virtual components 
and rearranging logical structure of the network. 
II. PRELIMINARY INFORMATION 
A. Software-Defined Networking 
The Software-Defined Networking (SDN) is a networking 
technology developed in 2008. SDN is an emerging architecture 
that is dynamic, manageable, cost-effective, and adaptable, 
making it ideal for the high-bandwidth, dynamic nature of 
today’s applications. This architecture decouples the network 
control and forwarding functions enabling the network control 
to become directly programmable and the underlying 
infrastructure to be abstracted for applications and network 
services. The control plane is logically centralized (in small 
scale implementations a single SDN controller is in use) and the 
control plane entity, i.e. the SDN Controller, is a software entity. 
The data planes entities can be hardware or software-based 
ones. The OpenFlow protocol is a foundational element for 
building SDN solutions, since it provides the basic interaction 
between the data plane and control plane.  
B. Network Functions Virtualization 
Network Function Virtualization (NFV) is a term used to 
represent the implementation of data-plane network functions in 
software, that is executed on commodity hosts [5]. It allows for 
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dynamic deployment of networking solutions that are made in 
software. NFV is designed to consolidate and deliver the 
networking components needed to support an infrastructure 
totally independent from hardware. These components include 
virtual compute, storage and network functions. NFV utilizes 
standard IT virtualization technologies that run on off-the-shelf 
hardware like commodity servers. It is applicable to any data 
plane processing or control plane function in both wired and 
wireless network infrastructures. The architectural components 
of NFV are Network Function Virtualization Infrastructure 
(NFVI) and Network Functions (NFs). NFVI consists of 
hardware (a single computer or a compute cluster), and 
framework software, which offers functions that are commonly 
required by NFs, such as NF placement, dynamic scaling, etc. 
Data-plane network functions considered for software 
implementation in commodity hosts range from basic packet 
forwarding (i.e. Open vSwitch – OVS) to complex middlebox 
functions such as intrusion detection and prevention systems. 
When NFs are executed on Virtual Machines (VMs), they are 
referred to as Virtual Network Functions (VNFs).  
C. NFV management and network orchestration 
NFV changes the way networks are managed. The 
management role is performed by NFV management and 
network orchestration (MANO) framework. NFV MANO is a 
concept developed by a working group within the European 
Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI). Its responsible 
for the management and orchestration of all resources in a 
virtualized environment including compute, networking, 
storage, and virtual machine (VM) resources. The main focus of 
NFV MANO is to allow flexible on-boarding of network 
components. 
NFV MANO is broken up into three functional blocks: 
− NFV Orchestrator – controls on-boarding of new 
VNF; manages VNF lifecycle and global resources; 
validates NFVI resource requests, 
− VNF Manager – supervises lifecycle management of 
VNF instances; coordinates configuration and event 
reporting between NFVI and Element/Network 
Management Systems. 
− Virtualized Infrastructure Manager (VIM) – controls 
and manages the NFVI compute, storage, and 
network resources. 
III. RELATED WORK 
A. Moving Target Defense 
From the cyber security perspective, the system can be 
described using the concept of the attack surface [6] and 
exploration surface [7] (Fig. 1a). The exploration surface is a 
space that attacker must explore or recon to determine the 
configuration of the target system before launching the actual 
attack. While the attack surface is formed by all of the different 
points, where an attacker could get into a system and is a 
concept to indicate the exploitable components in a system. 
Creating a more secure system usually is achieved by 
hardening it, i.e. closing unused ports, removing unneeded 
software or using the most current versions of software. This 
reduces the attack surface (Fig. 1b). The more advanced 
hardening techniques modify the attack surface at runtime in 
response to recognized threads, identified by intrusion detection 
systems (IDS), and reactively launch automated responses  
(Fig. 1c). The effectiveness of advanced hardening techniques 
is limited by the large number of false alarms from the IDS that 
can disrupt normal system operations. In addition, these 
techniques are ineffective against new and zero-day attacks. 
Instead of focusing on reducing the attack surface, MTD 
approaches seek to enlarge the exploration surface and move the 
attack surface at runtime to force the attacker to re-explore the 
exploration surface (Fig. 1d). The goal of an MTD techniques is 
to eliminate the attacker’s asymmetric advantage of time by 
deploying proactive mechanisms. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Demonstration of MTD concept 
Moving Target Defense is one of the most effective defense 
strategies to increase the attackers’ costs. The concept of MTD 
was proposed at first at the U.S. National Cyber Leap Year 
Summit in 2009. MTD has been defined as an approach that 
enables creating, analyzing, evaluating and deploying 
mechanisms and strategies, that are diverse and that continually 
shift and change over time to increase complexity and cost for 
attackers, limit the exposure of vulnerabilities and opportunities 
for attack, and increase system resiliency. A cyber MTD 
technique refers to any technique that attempts to defend a 
system and increase the complexity of cyber-attacks by making 
the system less homogeneous, static, or deterministic [8]. A 
comprehensive survey of cyber MTD techniques have been 
presented in [4].  
B. The Dynamic Networks 
The Dynamic Networks are one of five categories of MTD 
techniques [4]. Methods belonging to Dynamic Network MTD  
(DN-MTD) strive to break the static nature of a network by 
adding uncertainties and pursuing frequent changes of network 
states which make it harder for attackers to obtain the network 
states for launching attacks. The network-based MTD includes 
techniques that dynamically vary network aspects of a 
distributed computer network system. Any aspect providing 
network connectivity and enabling system transactions across 
multiple computing platforms is a candidate for MTD 
techniques. 
Example techniques included in this class are dynamic IP 
address assignment and/or port randomization [9] [10], host and 
rout mutation [11], protocol-obfuscation techniques [12] and 
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these techniques is periodically changing the structure of the 
network an adversary must use to access resources or data in the 
protected computer network system 
C. The SDN/NFV-based MTD 
In modern approaches NFV and SDN are commonly used 
together, however, they are different and serve different goals 
[14]. NFV aims at moving network services (switches, firewalls, 
IDS, etc.) away from dedicated hardware into a virtualized 
environment. SDN separates the network’s control and 
forwarding planes, thus enabling the network control to become 
directly programmable and the underlying infrastructure to be 
abstracted for applications. When SDN is combined with NFV, 
SDN’s centralized management can forward traffic from one 
network device to another, while NFV allows network device 
function (routing control, security or monitoring) to run on a 
VM or a container located in network server. Software Defined 
Networking and Network Function Virtualization provide 
excellent opportunities to implement MTD mechanisms 
efficiently. 
The combination of these techniques has been used in [15] 
to propose SDN/NFV-based moving target DDoS defense 
mechanism using multiple fuzzy systems and a proxy virtual 
network function (VNF) to achieve DDoS detection and 
 
mitigation. In [16] virtual shadow networks through NFV 
have been proposed to be used when implementing MTD 
mechanisms via route mutation. The idea was to dynamically 
change the routes for specific reconnaissance packets, so that 
attackers cannot be able to identify the actual network 
topologies for potential DDoS attacks, while enabling the 
defender to store potential attacker's information through a 
forensics feature. Another MTD method that uses SDN and 
NFV has been proposed in [17]. To implement additional 
defenses against penetration attack the decoy chains are deploy 
in the network for changing the attack. The SHIELD framework 
[18] applies NFV/SDN for virtualization and dynamic 
placement of virtualized security functions in the network. In 
combination with Big Data analytics it allows for real-time 
incident detection and mitigation. 
IV. NETWORK TOPOLOGY MUTATION  
A. Virtualized network 
The methods proposed in literature so far use NFV to 
extend the existing network with additional elements (honey 
networks, security functions) and SDN to dynamically change 




















































Fig. 2. Application of SDN/NFV to create virtualized network: a) logical network topology, b) corresponding physical and virtual components of the network 
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Fig. 3. Using virtualized network to change topology over time 
However these technologies allow creating virtualized 
network architectures (built of physical and virtual network 
components), that can be shaped and changed according to the 
needs. If network is expanded with a dedicated server running 
software for deployment, scaling, and management of 
virtualized network functions to introduce NFVI infrastructure, 
it allows creating virtualized network (Fig. 2b). NFVI allows 
creating virtual network elements in form of VNFs and SDN 
mechanisms make it possible to integrate these elements into a 
network. This creates logical topology of the network, that can 
be flexibly shaped (Fig. 2a).  
Application of NFV management and orchestration 
mechanisms allows to automate the process of moving from one 
virtualized network instance (logical network) to another. This 
makes it possible to implement completely new MTD technique 
that is based on changing virtualized network over time, by 
moving from one logical network topology to another (Fig. 3).  
B. Overview of the concept 
The general concept of the network topology mutation 
system is presented in Fig. 4. The system consists of four key 
components: 
− Virtualized Network (VN) – the concept assumes 
that the protected network is virtualized, i.e. is 
SDN-capable and equipped with NFVI, 
− Network Topology Management (NTM) – 
responsible for automated logical topology 
reconfiguration according to provided 
specification, 
− Network Monitoring (NM) – collects and 
analyzes network status information, 
− Topology Mutation Control (TMC) – decides 
about changes in logical topology and when the 
change will be performed. 
 
1) Virtualized Network 
Virtualized network consists of physical components, such 
as hosts, servers, SDN network switching elements. It also 
contains a dedicated NFVI, that allows to deploy and manage 
virtualized NFs. There are many solution available, that can be 
used to achieve NFVI functionality: commercial (i.e. Cisco 
NFV Infrastructure, VMware vCloud NFV virtualization 
platform), as well opensource (OpenStack, Kubernetes). NFVI 
 
is controlled by NTM module to instantiate VNFs necessary to 
create desired logical network topology (Fig. 2b). SDN network 
switching elements are controlled by SDN Controller to provide 
required connectivity. 
 
2) Network Topology Management 
NTM is composed of SDN Controller and NFV 
Management and Orchestration (MANO). NTM module’s role 
is to reconfigure logical topology of VN according to provided 
topology description. The description of the logical topology 
can be provided for example in Topology and Orchestration 
Specification for Cloud Applications (TOSCA). TOSCA is an 
open-source language used to describe the relationships and 
dependencies between services and applications that reside on a 
cloud computing platform.  
MANO is responsible for instantiation of VNFs required to 
create desired topology. This mechanism is based on three 
Managers: 
− Virtualized Infrastructure Manager (VIM) – 
manages life cycle of virtual resources in an NFVI 
domain; it creates, maintains and tears down 
virtual machines (VMs) from physical resources 
in an NFVI domain, keeps inventory of VMs 
associated with physical resources, is responsible 
for performance and fault management of 
hardware, software and virtual resources, keeps 
north bound APIs and exposes physical and virtual 
resources to other management systems, 
− VNF Manager (VNFM) – manages life cycle of 
VNFs, it creates, maintains and terminates VNF 
instances (installed on the VMs created and 
managed by VIM), is responsible for the FCAPS 
of VNFs, scales up/down VNFs (scaling up/down 
of CPU usage), 
− NFV Orchestrator (VNFO) – coordinates, 
authorizes, releases and engages NFVI resources 
by controlling the VIMs through their north bound 
APIs, creates end to end service among different 
VNFs 
SDN Controller is responsible for configuring SDN 
switching elements (physical and virtual) to direct network 
flows in such a way, that physical and virtual parts of the 
network are integrated to form desired logical topology. 
 










































Fig. 4. Schematic representation of network topology mutation system 
 
3) Network Monitoring 
NM collects from the network information, that can be used 
to asses security level. The information can be gathered from 
network security elements (physical or virtual), such as IDS, 
firewalls, system log analyzers, as well as from SDN Controller, 
that can provide information about network flows. This data is 
then used by anomaly detection algorithms to identify 
suspicious activity. A number of techniques, such as machine 
learning or data mining, can be used to support network 
monitoring. 
 
4) Topology Mutation Control 
TMC is responsible for selecting new network logical 
topology and generating topology specification required by 
NTM. The logical topology can be changed periodically or can 
be triggered by NM. TMC may select next logical topology 
from the set of precomputed configuration or generate one as 
response to thread identified by NM.  
V. MTD USING NETWORK TOPOLOGY MUTATION  
A. Threat Model 
According to a cyber kill-chain model, adversaries start an 
attack on a computer network by collecting as much information 
about the network as they can. Attackers identify the vulnerable 
elements of the network and then they connect to those 
vulnerable hosts and send attack payloads. Therefore, we 
considered the threat from reconnaissance phase for both direct 
and indirect attacks. We consider insider adversaries who have 
placed themselves in the network (on one or more hosts), using 
techniques such as social engineering, exploiting zero-day 
vulnerabilities, via drive by downloads or by manual infection.  
The proposed solution aims at creating a dynamic and 
variable network with logical topology changing over time, so 
as to make reconnaissance attacks on a target system much more 
complex and costly for attackers. We assume, that an attacker 
can scan a network and monitor the network traffic to acquire 
topology knowledge. Moreover, the adversary can eavesdrop 
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Fig. 6. Virtualized network configuration for LT1 
 
B. MTD Strategies 
Topology mutation system (TMS) allows implementing 
wide range of MTD strategies. Simple one are based on 
introduction virtual components in form of Honeypots or more 
complex Honey Nets. Fig. 5 presents the logical topology LT1 
of a network, where 3 virtual Honeypots have been introduced.  
To achieve this TMS has to create virtual hosts and virtual 
OVS switch in virtual part of the network. Appropriate flow 
rules have to be installed by SDN Controller at switches 
(physical and virtual). This can be done in a proactive approach, 
where the controller installs flow rules in advance for every host 
at every switch as the network gets configured. Fig. 6 shows the 
configuration of virtualized network to achieve logical topology 
LT1. 
More complex scenarios may involve deeper 
rearrangement of the network topology. Fig. 7 presents the 
logical topology LT2 of a network, where except that 3 virtual 
Honeypots and a virtual firewall were added, network segments 
have been rearranged. For example host E previously belonging 
to the segment of the network containing host F now has been 
moved to segment containing host A. Moreover hosts C, D and 
virtual host V2 have ben placed behind the firewall. 
To achieve this, appropriate NVFs have to instantiated 
using NFVI infrastructure and flow rules have to be installed by 
SDN Controller at switches (Fig. 8). However, to imitate 
topology LT2, TMS system must assign different network views 
to all nodes in a network. Network view is how a network looks 
from the perspective of given network node. This can be done 
by appropriate handling protocols used for network discovery 




Fig. 7. Logical topology LT2 
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MTD strategies implemented using presented approach 
may assume periodic changes in logical topology, where next 
topology configuration is selected from a set of precomputed 
configuration. The frequency of changes may depend on a 
security level indicated by the network monitoring subsystem. 
Frequent changes will confuse an attacker performing 
reconnaissance of the network. 
More sophisticated strategies may involve rearrangement 
of a logical network topology triggered by NM as a response to 
anomaly detected in the network. Logical network topology 
may be configured according to more detailed information 
about network security state. This may include introduction of 
additional virtual network security elements, such as IDS or 
firewalls, into network segments indicated by NM as being the 
source of suspicious traffic or activity.  
CONCLUSION 
The paper presents the novel concept of Moving Target 
Defense – topology mutation. Modern technologies, such as 
SDN, NFV and MANO provide sufficient functionalities to 
implemented proposed concept. There are commercial, as well  
as opensource solutions available, that may be used to create the 
described MTD system. A deception approach based on 
presented concept is outlined as a defense strategy against 
network reconnaissance. The topology mutation opens up the 
possibility to implement very sophisticated defense and 
deception strategies.  
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